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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN AGENCY'S
DETERMINATION OF FACT IN
NORTH DAKOTA
INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies have been present on the Amer-
ican scene since the founding of this country and the number
of agencies has increased steadily on both the state and
federal level.' The sharpest increase has come in the
last few decades as a result of the Depression, the New Deal
and other economic and political factors too numerous to
mention.2 This increase in the number of agencies, as well
as the increase in their powers and duties, has led to many
serious problems in the field of Administrative Law; one
of these is the problem of what the scope of judicial review
should be with regard to the fact-findings of administrative
agencies.
THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE
To answer the question as to what the scope of review
should be the courts have devised what is known as the
"substantial evidence" rule. Accordingly, if the evidence
in support of the agency's factual determination is substan-
tial and if after viewing such evidence in the light of con-
tradictory evidence it remains substantial, the court must
accept those findings. 3 This rule, although now written into
many statutes, 4 was originated by the courts because they
were reluctant to substitute their independent determination
1. See generally, DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.02 (1958).
2. Most of the important federal agencies have been established in this
period. e-g., National Labor Relations Board, 1935 Securities and Exchange
Commission, 1934 Federal Communications Commission, 1934 Federal Power
Commission, 1920, reorganized in 1930, Civil Aeronautics Board, 1938, reorgan-
Ized in 1958.
3. See Universal Camera Co. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 210 (1958).
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of facts, in highly specialized fields, when the agency's de-
termination appeared to have been reasonably made.
5
There were two reasons generally given for this judicial
restraint. The first being that because the legislature had
given the agency power to make the initial findings of fact,
its determinations deserved considerable weight in the courts.6
The second, and perhaps strongest, reason was that the
agencies were supposedly expert in their fields and thus
were much better qualified to make findings than were the
judges who lacked the special or technical knowledge upon
which to base a correct decision.
As can be expected with any rule such as this, differ-
ences of opinion arose as to what the term "substantial
evidence" actually meant. The United States Supreme Court
defined it in Consolidated Edison Co. v NLRB as fol-
laws: "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The next year
in NLRB v Columbia Enameling & Stamping Co. 9 the court
expanded on this definition by saying:
[It is] evidence which is substantial, that is,
affording a substantial basis of fact from which the
fact in issue can be reasonably inferred , it must
be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury,
a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion
sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the
jury
Even the courts that understood what the term meant were
often confused as to how it should be applied to actual cases.
Three different approaches were often taken. On one
extreme was the theory that if any evidence could be found
in the administrative record that substantially supported the
5. See ICC v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541 (1912).
6. See State v. Great No. Ry., 130 Minn. 57, 153 N.W 247 (1915).
7. Cf., Director, United States Bureau of Mines v. Princess Elkhorn Coal Co..
226 F.2d 570, 574 (1955), "The members of the Federal Coal Mine Safety Board
of Review are much better qualified than are the members of this court to inter-
pret the meaning of the word 'face' as used in the Act, in the context of the
facts found by the Board."
8. 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
9. 306 U.S. 292, 299 (1939).
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agency's finding, no matter how strong the rest of the evi-
dence was to the contrary, this was sufficient to satisfy the
rule.10 On the other extreme was the theory that to deter-
mine if there was "substantial evidence" the court must go
through the entire record and weigh each piece of evidence.
This meant, in effect, that the court would make an independ-
ent determination as to the facts in order to establish if,
in fact, there was enough evidence to support the agency's
decision.1' This differed little from granting a trial de
novo. 1 2 In 1951, after the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act 3 and the Taft-Hartley Act,' 4 the court in
Universal Camera Co. v NLRB 5 rejected both extremes
and adopted a middle ground known as the "whole record"
test. The court said it must first consider the evidence
which supports the agency's findings to determine if it is
substantial. It must then consider the opposing evidence and
determine if in view of this opposing evidence the evidence
supporting the agency is still substantial. 1 6 Using this test
it is apparent that in applying the "substantial evidence"
rule the record should be viewed as a whole; however,
the judges should not substitute their independent judgment
as to the facts, but should determine only whether in view
of all the evidence the agency could have reasonably come
to its conclusion.1
7
From this discussion it can be seen that on the federal
level the courts do, or at least are supposed to, give great
weight to the agency fact-determinations which come to
them on appeal." On the federal level the Courts of
Appeals are the ones which usually apply the "substantial
10. Cf., Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949). This case presented the
question of the amount of evidence necessary to deny a directed verdict. See
also, Universal Camera Co. v. NLRB, supra note 3, wherein the Court indicated
that perhaps this was the view taken in prior cases.
11. FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1922).
12. California Co. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 200 Miss. 824, 27 So. 2d 542 (1946)
In Re Russell, 68 N.D. 447, 281 N.W 239 (1938).
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1946).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1947).
15. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
16. Id. at 487, 488.
17. Id. at 488.
18. See generally, Cooper, Administrative Law The "Substantial Evidence"
Rule, 44 A.B.A.J. 945 (1958).
[VOL. 40
1964] NOTES 295
evidence" rule since they are normally the first to hear an
appeal. The Supreme Court need only decide if the Courts
of Appeals have applied the rule correctly 19 Whether the




In North Dakota most of the administrative law cases
come from the decisions of two agencies, the Workmen's
Compensation Bureau and the Public Service Commission.
But, as is the case on the federal level, North Dakota admin-
istrative agencies are increasing in number each year .
In 1941 the Legislature passed the Administrative Agencies
Uniform Practices Act-2  (hereafter referred to as the
AAUPA) The AAUPA, like the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act,'23 was designed to correct many defects in
the existing administrative practices. It was also designed
to consolidate the diverse systems and procedures used by
various agencies.2
4
The AAUPA expressly provides:
The court shall affirm the decision of the agency
unless it shall find that the findings of fact
made by the agency are not supported by the evi-
dence, or that the conclusions and decisions of the
agency are not supported by its findings of fact.
2
The wording of this section, when viewed in context with
the rest of the chapter, indicates that "supported by the
evidence" means "supported by substantial evidence", 26 and
19. Universal Camera Co. v. NLRB, supra note 15, at 491.
20. See, e.g., Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953) O'Leary v.
Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
21. Compare the STATE op NORTH DAKOTA DIRECTORY of 1963 with those of
prior years.
22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32 (1961).
23. See generally, LAVERY, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, pt. 1 (1952), for
a good analysis of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.
24. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01(1) (1961) provides " 'Administrative agency'
or 'the agency' shall include any, officer, board, commission, bureau, department,
or tribunal other than a court, having state-wide Jurisdiction and authority to
make any order, finding, determination, award, or assessment which has the
force and effect of law and which by statute is subject to review in the courts
of this state."
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-19 (1961).
26. Federal courts have consistently supplied the term "substantial evidence"
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the court has apparently so construed it.2 7  Prior to the
effective date of the AAUPA the court indicated in Applica-
tion of Theel Bros. Rapid Transit Co. 28 that its scope of
review was limited by the "substantial evidence" rule.
29
Since the North Dakota Supreme Court has construed
the AAUPA to include the "substantial evidence rule", which
originated in the Federal courts, one might reasonably con-
clude that it would mean the same thing in both jurisdictions;
this is simply not the case. Prior to 1941, when the AAUPA
was passed, there was a right to trial de novo on appeal from
most administrative decisions. This right came from the
express wording of the statutes in most cases,30 but in
others it came from judicial statutory interpretation.31
The court, hearing a case on review, was not necessarily
restricted to the record made by the agency 32 as it now is
under the AAUPA.3 3  When the AAUPA was passed it con-
tained no language expressly continuing the right to a trial
de novo; this, coupled with the fact that the courts were
now restricted to the agency record, made it appear that
perhaps a trial de novo could no longer be requested. The
Court, however, in Application of Midwest Motor Express34
stated that there was still a right to trial de novo in both
the District Courts and the Supreme Court.
32 5
As can be seen from the prior discussion this holding
presents somewhat of a dilemma. The dictionary definition
where the statute made no specific mention of it. An illustration of this is
NLRB v. Columbia Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299 (1939).
27. See Application of Ditsworth, 78 N.D. 3, 5, 48 N.W.2d 22, 24 (1951),
Great No. Ry. v. McDonnell, 77 N.D. 802, 812, 45 N.W.2d 721, 725 (1950).
28. 72 N.D. 280, 6 N.W.2d 560 (1942)
29. Id. at 564.
30. See e.g., N.D. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 286, § 6, provided for a trial de novo
in the Supreme Court in workmen's compensation cases.
31. E.g., N.D. Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 164, § 29, expressly provided for a trial
de novo in District Court. The Court in Tn-Motor Transp. Co. v. Great No. Ry.,
67 N.D. 119, 270 N.W 100 (1936) construed this section to mean that appeals
from the Board of Railroad Commissioners could also be tried de novo in the
Supreme Court.
32. But see, Comp. Laws of N.D. § 4609c42 (Supp. 1925). Appeals from the
Board of Railroad Commissioners were restricted to the administrative record.
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-19 (1961).
34. 74 N.D. 416, 23 N.W.2d 49 (1946).
35. Id. at 52. The court cited N.D. REV. CODE §§ 28-3219, 28-3221, 28-2732
(1943), and stated that these three sections when construed together require a
trial de novo in both courts.
36. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY. See In Re Heart River
Irr. Dist. 78 N.D. 302, 316, 49 N.W.2d 217, 225 (1951).
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of de novo is: anew, afresh, over again.3 6  The Court
apparently accepts this definition for it said in In re Russell: 37
In order to try the case de novo, the District Court
must, of necessity, weigh the evidence and apply
questions to which it relates, and determine whether
its independent judgement to such evidence and the
the order or decision appealed from is in accord with
the weight of the evidence.
Whatever the "substantial evidence" rule might mean, it
does not mean a trial de novo .
3
Granting that the parties have a right by statute to a
trial de novo, this does not necessarily prevent the Court
from deciding the cases by application of the "substantial
evidence" rule.3 9 Since the rule originated in judge-made
law it can be applied regardless of statute.40  In many
cases this might appear to be the path taken by the Court.4 '
In other cases it is apparent from a reading of the opinion
that the court has weighed the evidence, made its own deter-
mination of the facts and set aside the agency's decision
without paying more than lip service to the "substantial
evidence" rule.
42
One possible explanation of the Court's variation in its
decisions might be that in most of the cases where the Court
appears to have decided the issues making an independent
evaluation, the opinion points out that a trial de novo was
specifically asked for the appellant. 43  In the cases which
seem to lean toward the "substantial evidence" rule the
37. 68 N.D. 447, 454, 281 N.W 239, 243 (1938). Accord, California Co. v. State
Oil & Gas Bd., 200 Miss. 824, 27 So. 2d 542 (1946).
38. See Universal Camera Co. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
39. E.g., State Bd. of Medical Registration v. Scherer, 221 Ind. 92, 46 N.E.2d
602 (1943) The Court held that the trial de novo provision must be regarded as
merely providing a procedure for seeking review. California Co. v. State Oil &
Gas Bd., supra note 37. The Court held that in spite of this section the scope of
review must be limited to the "substantial evidence" rule.
40. See ICC v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541 (1912), State v. Great No.
Ry., 130 Minn. 57, 153 N.W 247 (1915).
41. See e.g., Mickelson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 89 N.W.2d
89 (N.D. 1958) Williams Elec. Co-op. v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 79 N.W.2d
508 (N.D. 1956) Application of Ditsworth, 78 N.D. 3, 48 N.W.2d 22 (1951) Great
No. Ry. v. McDonnell, 77 N.D. 802, 45 N.W.2d 721 (1950).
42. See e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. Anderson, 95 N.W.2d 582 (N.D. 1959)
Gullickson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 83 N.W.2d 826 (N.D.1957) Feist v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 77 N.D. 267, 42 N.W.2d
665 (1950) , Application of Midwest Motor Express, 74 N.D. 416, 23 N.W.2d 49
(1946).
43. See cases cited note 42 supra.
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opinion generally makes no mention of whether or not a
trial de novo was requested. 44  This explanation has some
support from the case-law 5 but it is weakened by several
exceptions to this general pattern4 6 and by the lack of support
from the AAUPA.4 7 A comparison of the dates of the cases
casts no light on the subject, for such a comparison reveals
no trend either toward or away from giving great weight to
agency decisions.
4
It appears that the correct explanation of this apparent
variation lies in what the court has done rather than what
it has said. In all of the cases one is left with the impression
that in reviewing the record and the decision of an agency
the Court is not looking so much to whether the agency
was reasonable in its conclusions as it is to whether the
agency was "right" Thus, even in cases where the Court
has sustained the agency decision as being supported by
"substantial evidence" it appears that it has to some extent
weighed the evidence. 49 This writer believes that North Da-
kota, in spite of statements to the contrary,50 does not actually
follow the "substantial evidence" rule. The actual test on
review of an agency decision in North Dakota does not seem
to be whether or not the findings of the agency are sup-
ported by "substantial evidence" but rather, whether or not
the findings are supported by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 51 Since the preponderance of the evidence can only
be determined by weighing the evidence, this is exactly
44. See cases cited note 41 supra.
45. See Security Imp. Co. v. Cass County, 9 N.D. 553, 84 N.W 477 (1900).
The court held that if an appellant wishes to have the court re-examine the
evidence or retry a particular question of fact pursuant to N.D. Sess. Laws 1897,
ch. 5, § 6, N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-27-32 (1961) he must so specify in his statement
of the case. This case would seem to have little effect on the present cases because
normally when the facts are in issue upon appeal, the appellant is going to
specify in his statement that he wishes those facts retried.
46. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Anderson, supra note 42 Mickelson v. North Dakota
Workmen's Comp. Bureau, supra note 41.
47. Even if an appellant might be prevented from obtaining a trial de novo
in the Supreme Court because of his failure to request it pursuant to N.D.
'CENT. CODE § 28-27-32 (1961), there is no language in § 28-32-19 which can be
reasonably construed to place such a limitation on the District Courts.
48. Compare the dates of the cases cited in note 41 supra, with those in note
42 supra.
49. See e.g., Application of Ditsworth, supra note 41.
50. See cases cited in notes 27, 28, and 41 supra.
51. See In Re Hanson, 74 N.D. 224, 227, 21 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1945). "If the
preponderance of the evidence supports the findings of the commission, the courts
do not substitute their judgefents for that of the commission."
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what the Court has done. The Court itself stated this propo-
sition quite forcefully in In re Russell: 52
but the power granted and the duty imposed
on the District Court on such appeal is not satis-
fied by an inquiry as to whether there is substan-
tial evidence in support of the decision or order of the
Board of Railroad Commissioners. Where trial de
novo is demanded and had, the duty extends to
weighing the evidence, and the exercise of independ-
ent judgment upon the evidence submitted and a
determination as to where the weight or preponder-
ance of the evidence lies.
This is not to say, of course, that the Court does not in
many cases give substantial weight to the agency decision.
It does mean, however, that the Court will feel no compunc-
tion about reversing an agency fact-determination which it
feels is wrong, even though the agency might have been
reasonable in coming to its conclusion.
5 3
If this is the correct evaluation of the cases then the
scope of judicial review has changed little from what it was
in Minneapolis St.P & S. S. M. R. v State Bd. of Ry Com'rs.,
5 4
wherein the Court made it clear that it did not feel com-
pelled to give great weight to the agency decision,
5 5 but
acknowledged that the case might arise where, because of
the expertise of the agency, the agency decision would be
entitled to great weight.5 6 The determining factor then, as
set down in that case, is the nature of the subject matter,
and the weight given to the agency decision will be deter-
mined accordingly This would explain why the Court is
giving more weight to the findings of the Public Service
Commission than to those of the Workmen's Compensation
Bureau. 57 The obvious explanation is that the cases brought
52. Supra note 37, at 243.
53. See e.g., Gullickson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 83 N.W.2d
826 (1957) Even though the Court reversed the agency decision there appears to
have been ample evidence to say that the Bureau was not entirely unreasonable
in reaching its decision.
54. 30 N.D. 221, 152 N.W 513 (1915).
55. Id. at 516.
56. Ibid.
57. Since the AAUPA was passed in 1941 there have been nine cases appealed
from the Workmen's Compensation Bureau on the grounds that it was in error
on its determination of facts of these nine, six were reversed and only three
NOTES 2991964]
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to the Court from the Public Service Commission are cases
which generally go a little beyond the normal scope of the
judiciary A good illustration of this is found in Application
of Ditsworth 5s where the Commission was to determine if
the public convenience and necessity would be served by
granting the petitioner's application to establish a new taxi-
cab line. This question is clearly more administrative than
judicial. The cases appealed from the Workmen's Compen-
sation Bureau, on the other hand, generally present problems
which the lawyers and judges deal with every day An
example of this is found in Feist v North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau5 9 where the issue was one of proxi-
mate cause, i.e., did the decedent's illness arise from the
course of his employment. On an issue such as this the
courts may feel that they are as well qualified to make a
judgment as is the agency The difference in treatment
of the two agencies might well be summed up by the Court's
statement in Great Northern Ry v McDonnell." "We try
the case anew upon the record not as an administrative
body, but as a court exercising judicial powers but not ad-
ministrative discretion."
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the underlying reason for the reluctance on the
part of the North Dakota Supreme Court to follow the "sub-
stantial evidence" rule, as it is found on the federal level,
is the natural reluctance of the judiciary to yield judicial
power to administrative agencies when the subject matter
of the cases is such that the courts feel they are as well
qualified to pass judgment as are the agencies. This argu-
ment has an appealing ring in a state such as North Dakota
because it may well be that the agencies of this state are
not faced with the highly technical problems that face the
federal agencies. There has always been a fear in many
sustained. In the same length of time there have also been nine cases appealed
from the Public Service Commission on the same grounds, of these nine, only
three have been reversed and the other six sustained.
58. Supra note 49.
59. 77 N.D. 267, 42 N.W.2d 665 (1950).
60. 77 N.D. 802, 812, 45 N.W.2d 721, 725 (1950).
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quarters that if the administrative agencies, being as they
are beyond the direct reach of the citizenry, are given too
much independence and power individual rights will soon
suffer This argument, too, has a good deal of merit, but the
fact still remains that the basic purpose of such agencies
is to expedite the administration of laws, and if the agencies
are to fulfill this purpose they must be given a good deal of
latitude in their operation. It seems to this writer that for
the courts to make an independent judgment of the facts
upon the same evidence, which the agency based its deter-
mination upon, reduces the agency to little more than an
evidence gathering service. This was probably not the in-
tent of the Legislature. It can hardly be argued that giving
three separate tribunals an opportunity to make three sepa-
rate and independent judgments on the same record creates
more efficient administration of the laws.
LYNN CROOKS
